

S E C R E TA P P E N D I XSSE VIEWS AND CONCLUSIONS APPLICABLE TO
PLANNING IN THE FIELD OF OVERT* PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

1. Certain fundamental considerations present themselves in the early stages of overt psychological warfare planning.

These are:

- a. An appropriate and acceptable definition for overt psychological warfare consistent with United States military and political concepts;
- b. Determination of the objectives of overt psychological warfare; the analysis, evaluation and selection of facts related to targets and purposes supporting national policy and approved military plans;
- c. Adequate evaluation of the proportional import of tactical and strategic propaganda in support of approved military plans and in support of long-term U.S. national objectives;
- d. In readiness for participation in initial emergency operations in time of war or threat of war: (1) to maintain a nucleus peacetime activity; (2) to provide transitional steps from peace to war; (3) to plan minimum initial wartime overt psychological warfare organization;
- e. Planning in all its phases demands the support of the comprehensive and realistic analysis of propaganda and related efforts of foreign sources; including continuing estimates of the propaganda and information organization, capabilities, techniques and objectives of potential enemy or enemies;
- f. The relation of the organization responsible for overt psychological warfare to a wartime domestic information activity;

*SANACC directed the Subcommittee for Special Studies and Evaluations, on 13 August 1948 (SANA-6199), to restrict its activities to overt psychological warfare. Limits of the fields of overt and covert psychological warfare have not been adequately and authoritatively delineated. (Related to 1 a. above.)

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g. Overt psychological warfare and its relation to intra-United States and territorial censorship.

2. Comprehensive planning in this field requires concurrent logistical planning of an over-all nature, not only by the participating departments and agencies but by all other pertinent agencies of the government. War plans for psychological warfare must be developed concurrent with logistics plans so that Executive Departments are in readiness for rapid mobilization on D-day.

3. Overt psychological warfare operations in war must support:

a. Approved military plans and operations. These include plans and operations in theaters of military operation; also coordination with the general command structure. Planning an overt psychological warfare organization should, therefore, adhere to the basic principles underlying the General Staff system.

b. Approved United States political and diplomatic actions. Planning, therefore, must recognize the necessity of coordination with the foreign representational system of the Department of State, in both its diplomatic and foreign information branches.

4. Planning requires: (1) information of personnel, available by current or past experience, or by aptitude, in the State Department and National Military Establishment; (2) development of standards of curricula and training, and of a centralized training center; (3) an approved national mobilization plan continually revised in keeping with national policy and budgetary considerations.

5. Planning will require research and development to satisfy the requirements of the Department of State, as well as the National Military Establishment, whose research is coordinated by the Research and Development Board of the National Military Establishment.

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6. Planning will require a study of the special intelligence requirements of an overt psychological warfare organization and a procedure for fulfilling these needs, using the established intelligence agencies of the government (CIA, State, and in the NME).

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